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"Harris, Milton"
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Effect of pegylation on pharmaceuticals
Protein and peptide drugs hold great promise as therapeutic agents. However, many are degraded by proteolytic enzymes, can be rapidly cleared by the kidneys, generate neutralizing antibodies and have a short circulating half-life. Pegylation, the process by which polyethylene glycol chains are attached to protein and peptide drugs, can overcome these and other shortcomings. By increasing the molecular mass of proteins and peptides and shielding them from proteolytic enzymes, pegylation improves pharmacokinetics. This article will review how PEGylation can result in drugs that are often more effective and safer, and which show improved patient convenience and compliance.
Journal Article
Batgirl, the Bronze Age omnibus
\"Batgirl started her vigilante career when mild-mannered librarian Barbara Gordon, daughter of famed police commissioner Jim Gordon, attended a costume party gone awry. It wasn't long before the teenage genius crime-fighter became a regular feature of Batman's world and an icon to generations of young readers.\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
A Theory of Board Control and Size
This article presents a model of optimal control of corporate boards of directors. We determine when one would expect inside versus outside directors to control the board, when the controlling party will delegate decisionmaking to the other party, the extent of communication between the parties, and the number of outside directors. We show that shareholders can sometimes be better off with an insidercontrolled board. We derive endogenous relationships among profits, board control, and the number of outside directors that call into question the usual interpretation of some documented empirical regularities.
Journal Article
Organization Design
This paper attempts to explain organization structure based on optimal coordination of interactions among activities. The main idea is that each manager is capable of detecting and coordinating interactions only within his limited area of expertise. Only the CEO can coordinate company wide interactions. The optimal design of the organization trades off the costs and benefits of various configurations of managers. Our results consist of classifying the characteristics of activities and managerial costs that lead to the matrix organization, the functional hierarchy, the divisional hierarchy, or a fiat hierarchy. We also investigate the effect of changing the costs of various managers on the nature of the optimal organization, including the extent of centralization.
Journal Article
The Theory of Capital Structure
This paper surveys capital structure theories based on agency costs, asymmetric information, product/input market interactions, and corporate control considerations (but excluding tax-based theories). For each type of model, a brief overview of the papers surveyed and their relation to each other is provided. The central papers are described in some detail, and their results are summarized and followed by a discussion of related extensions. Each section concludes with a summary of the main implications of the models surveyed in the section. Finally, these results are collected and compared to the available evidence. Suggestions for future research are provided.
Journal Article
The Capital Budgeting Process: Incentives and Information
We study the capital allocation process within firms. Observed budgeting processes are explained as a response to decentralized information and incentive problems. It is shown that these imperfections can result in underinvestment when capital productivity is high and overinvestment when it is low. We also investigate how the budgeting process may be expected to vary with firm or division characteristics such as investment opportunities and the technology for information transfer.
Journal Article
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management
This article addresses the issue of whether shareholders would be better off with enhanced control over corporate decisions. The issue has been hotly debated in the recent literature. Our main contribution is to use formal modeling to uncover some factors overlooked in these arguments. For example, we show that claims that shareholder control would reduce value because shareholders lack sufficient information to make important decisions or because they have a non-value-maximizing agenda are flawed. We also show, however, that even if shareholders seek to maximize firm value and can delegate decisions to management, shareholders should not control all major decisions.
Journal Article
Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt
This paper provides a theory of capital structure based on the effect of debt on investors' information about the firm and on their ability to oversee management. We postulate that managers are reluctant to relinquish control and unwilling to provide information that could result in such an outcome. Debt is a disciplining device because default allows creditors the option to force the firm into liquidation and generates information useful to investors. We characterize the time path of the debt level and obtain comparative statics results on the debt level, bond yield, probability of default, probability of reorganization, etc.
Journal Article